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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45137
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR 2016-2071
v. )
)
ISOM LEE HUDSON, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Isom Hudson contends  the  district  court  imposed  an  excessive  term of  sentence  in  this
case.  The district court’s statements at the sentencing hearing indicated it was intending to give
upon the rehabilitation process.  Therefore, its decision to exceed the parties’ jointly-
recommended term for the underlying sentence constitutes an abuse of its discretion.  As such,
this Court should reduce Mr. Hudson’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively,
remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hudson pled guilty to driving under the influence, and
the State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
(R., p.93.)  This was his first felony DUI, and second overall felony conviction.  (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.5-9.)  Despite some struggles during prior periods of
incarceration, Mr. Hudson had been successfully discharged from parole in the prior felony case.
(PSI, p.11.)  He also reported receiving a Gold Seal during a prior period of supervised release.
(PSI, p.10.)
Defense counsel joined the State’s recommendation in regard to the underlying sentence.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9.)  However, defense counsel also recommended the district court retain
jurisdiction over the case.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.4-9.)  In his allocution, Mr. Hudson explained that his
comments about this case in his PSI were a product of him being frustrated with the way events
had unfolded, and he made it clear he did accept responsibility for his actions.1  (Tr., p.22,
Ls.13-20; accord Tr., p.21, Ls.16-21.)  The district court noted that the rider program might be
difficult for Mr. Hudson given his history and his age,2 but Mr. Hudson assured the district court
he was willing and able to be successful in that program anyway.  (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-22.)
The district court accepted Mr. Hanson’s assurance and retained jurisdiction over the
case.  (Tr., p.26, L.19.)  However, it also noted its initial intention was to execute his entire
sentence, “top out your time,” let him “act how you want in prison,” and “then it will be done.”
1 Specifically, another motorist had called to report a potential drunk driver, and officers
ultimately found the car in question parked at the Pit Stop Grill, with Mr. Hudson was sitting in
the driver’s seat, and several open alcoholic beverage containers and a gun were visible in the
car.  (R., pp.17-19.)  Mr. Hudson was concerned about the officer’s ability to arrest him for
driving under the influence when the officer had not actually seen him driving, and he was
frustrated with the other driver for reporting the incident.  (PSI, p.4.)
2 Mr. Hudson was 57 years old at the time.  (PSI, p.1.)
3(Tr., p.23, Ls.5-11.)  Ultimately, it exceeded the joint recommendation and imposed an
underlying sentence of ten years, with four years fixed instead.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.17-19.)
Mr. Hudson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.129,
147.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence with an excessive term.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing A Sentence With An Excessive Term
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)
(articulating the standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion).  The
protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau,
124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is the first
means the district court should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
The shorter term of sentence which the parties both recommended would better serve
those goals of sentencing because that sentence would acknowledge Mr. Hudson’s amenability
to treatment and his efforts to begin rehabilitating himself, and so, encourage continued
4rehabilitation. See, e.g., State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010) (acknowledging
accepting responsibility is a factor which should be considered in mitigation); State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging amenability to treatment is a factor which
should be considered in mitigation).
For example, Mr. Hudson assured the district court he was willing and able to engage in
the new rider program despite the potential hurdles he might face in that program.  (Tr., p.23,
Ls.1-22.)  This dedication to actually participating in a treatment program is particularly
important since it shows Mr. Hudson understood rehabilitation will take continuing efforts on his
part, that despite his previous successes (see Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.3 (noting he had completed
the old rider program); PSI, p.10 (indicating he had earned a Gold Seal during a prior period of
supervised release)), he was beginning to struggle again.  (See, e.g., R., p.118 (a urinalysis result
indicating a potentially-diluted sample.)  As such, his desire to go through the new rider program
demonstrated his desire to learn additional skills to more-appropriately deal with those
re-emerging issues.
To that  point,  Mr.  Hudson was  starting  to  make  efforts  in  that  direction.   For  example,
some of his issues in attending urinalysis tests during his pretrial release was that, at times, he
had  to  walk  approximately  ten  miles  from Rupert  to  Burley  to  take  those  tests.   (See Tr., p.6,
Ls.23-25.)  And yet, he did that for tests and court dates.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.6.)
Thus, Mr. Hudson’s actions demonstrated he has taken the first steps toward rehabilitation.
See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815.  Those efforts which should have been acknowledged in the
imposition of the underlying sentence, so as to encourage continued rehabilitation.
The district court, on the other hand, indicated its intention was to give up on the
rehabilitation process – to have Mr. Hanson “top out your time,” “act how you want in prison,”
5and “then it will be done.”  (Tr., p.23, Ls.5-11.)  As such, its decision to act in line with that
intention and impose an underlying sentence which exceeded the joint recommendation of the
parties, rather than encourage continued rehabilitation, fails to serve the goals of sentencing.
Therefore, its decision in that regard constituted an abuse of its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hudson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 30th day of November, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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